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This paper gives one possible explanation why the regional authorities in Russia intervene in local markets
combining subsidizing and tax exemptions.
Theoretical framework of the analysis is modified model proposed by G.Grossman and E.Helpman. The
authors consider lobbing effect on the international trade protection policy, and focus of the analysis is
equilibrium prices resulted from export and import subsidies. Our problem is slightly different; firstly,
regional governments can not use export and import tariffs and subsidies, however they can provide input,
output subsidies and tax exemptions, secondly, regional governments are more restricted financially and
problem of the financial acceptability of the protection policy needs introduction of regional budget
constraint into the model, and, finally, we are interested not in equilibrium prices but in equilibrium
combinations of different tools of the protection policy.
Theoretical features of the equilibrium regional protection policy are tested empirically for the Russian
regions. The estimations have shown that the regional protection is provided because of political pressure
of lobbing groups representing interests of the local industrial sectors. The social factors are not in the
focus of the policy-maker's concern and are not significant when the authorities make decision about size
of budget resources directed for the purpose of the local producers' protection.
JEL Classification: D78, H20
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1. Introduction
Regional leaders are inclined to interference in
the regulation of local economy everywhere in Rus-
sia. Almost all regional policy-makers base the mi-
cro-management at their jurisdictions on the prote-
ction of domestic enterprises and on the resistance to
the expansion ofthe external ones (Henson (200 1».
Tools of the regional protection include tax
exemptions, credits, subsidies, budget compensa-
tions. Since federal budget subsidies decreased in
Russia the regional authorities have more actively
involved in the supporting of enterprises. However
the level of subsidizing and providing tax exemptions
differ essentially among the regions.
Very often regional authorities explain the price
control, subsidizing and granting tax exemptions to
local producers by social imperatives. However se-
veral facts contradict this thesis. A characteristic of
the regional budgets is a high -Ievel of overdue for
salary and transfers to population (more than 40%),
the next item is overdue to infrastructure monopolies,
supplying public utilities (28%) (Report of the World
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Bank (2000». Hence, the biggest part of burden, re-
sulted form regional policy is imposed on population.
The regional protection of local producers
contradicts to the federal macroeconomic policy and
hinders market integration in Russia. Why do the
regional authorities pursue this costly policy and
intervene in local markets by combining subsidizing
and tax exemptions? There are several candidate
explanations in the economic literature related to our
problem: political constraints of transition period,
interest groups, and attitudes towards governments.
Although price liberalization is the key element
of transition and is a necessary precondition for the
market mechanisms and for the improvement in the
allocation of resources (Lipton and Sachs (1990),
Boyko (1992), McKinnon (1991» political con-
straints of the transition period could make gradual
price reform preferable despite its efficiency costs
(Dewatripont and Roland (1992 a, b), Roland
(2000». What policy-makers put in place depends on
the political acceptability of the reforms. Milder
reforms and even reversal sometimes are the only
way to speed up the process and enhance political
acceptability.
Political constraints affecting the speed and de-
sign of price reforms are determined by initial condi-
tions. Kruegel and Ciolko (1996) and Castanheira
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and Popov (1999) suggest that the rate and extend of
price liberalization may be endogenous. The worse
the initial conditions for transformation the greater
the probability of the deep transformation recession
as a result of the liberalization, and hence there are
more likely delays in liberalization. When initial
conditions are favorable, rapid liberalization is
feasible and preferable.
The political constraints are reinforced when the
fact that bureaucrats and regulators may benefit from
the persistence of price control is taken into account.
Shliefer and Vishny (1992) show that price control
creates rent for state sector and represents oppor-
tunities for soliciting bribes from interest groups.
The role of lobby groups in the shape of trade
policy is incorporated into analysis in two ways. The
first approach stresses political competition between
opposing candidates. In the works of Magee et al.
(1989), Hillman and Ursprung (1988), the lobby
groups evaluate their prospects after the alternative
trade policy proposals have been made by competing
parties. In making the decisions about their giving, the
lobbies weigh the benefit of increasing the proba-
bility of their favorite party being elected against the
direct cost for the donation. The parties use the
resources to influence the election outcome. In the
second approach presented in Stigler (1971), Hillman
(1982), Grossman and Helpman (1994), the econo-
mic policy is considered as being set by an incumbent
government seeking to maximize its political sup-
port. The political support function has as arguments
the welfare that designated interest groups derive
from the chosen policies and the deadweight loss that
the policies impose on society at large. In this formu-
lation, campaign contributions do not enter directly
into the analysis, and the political competition of the
next election is kept in the background. Both of the ap-
proaches consider the political optimization as under-
lying the endogenous determination of trade policy.
Features of the regional policy in Russia corres-
pond more to the second approach. The realities ofthe
regional policy life are, firstly, absence of concrete
trade policy public proposals at the election stage
and, secondly, interest of regional authorities and
local business in mutual cooperation.
Local policy depends also on the attitudes to-
wards the governments. Paper by Edwards and Keen
(1996) synthesizes the two extremes: the view of go-
vernment as a Leviathan and the view of government
as a benevolent maximiser of their citizens' welfare.
The policy-makers have preferences defined over
some item of public expenditures, which, while
financed from general revenues, benefit only the
policy-maker, and the welfare of their representative
citizen. Polishchuk (2000) shows that under certain
assumptions a revenue-maximizing Leviathan-type
government might offer better conditions for eco-
nomic development than a benevolent, which is con-
cerned about economic wellbeing of its constituency
at large.
So a design of regional protection policy is a
result of a number offactors, among which are initial
conditions, political process, influence of interest
groups, and objectives of the policy-makers. Based
on the results of the reviewed studies we propose a
model of regional trade policy determination.
2. The model
2.1.Statement of theproblem
We consider a regional market, so we may assu-
me that the economy is small and market regulation is
the result of the political process. One of the chara-
cteristics of Russian regional economies is a high level
of specialization in the production, the producers have
incentives to form lobby groups and they demonstrate
ability to overcome the free-rider problem.
The regional lobby groups confront regional
policy-makers with requirements to provide protec-
tion for the sector against external producers in ex-
change for political support. The regional govern-
ment bears costs for implementing an inefficient
protection policy that is result of creating deadweight
loss and its accountability to the general electorate.
The government sets protection policy comparing
benefits of the political cooperation with local pro-
ducers and costs of deterioration of its reelection pro-
spects. The implemented policy must be financially
feasible.
The proposed theoretical framework for the
analysis of the barriers of regional price regulation is
very similar to the one developed by Grossman and




2.2. Overview of Grossman - Helpman's
results
Grossman and Helpman consider a small, com-
petitive economy. Free trade is efficient for such an
economy, so any policy interventions can be ascribed
to the political process. They assume that there is a
high degree of concentration in the ownership of the
specific inputs and that the various owners of some of
these inputs have banded together to form lobby
groups. They assume also that some factor owners
overcome the free-rider problem to conduct joint
lobbying activity, while other do not.
The lobby groups may offer political contribu-
tions to the incumbent politicians, who are in a po-
sition to set the current trade policy. While the lobby
groups ignore the effects oftheir contributions on the
election probabilities, the incumbent politicians may
see a relationship between total collections and their
reelection prospects. Incumbent politicians' objective
is to maximize a weighted sum of total political
contributions and aggregate social welfare.
The authors model the lobbing process as fol-
lows. Each interest group confronts the government
with a contribution schedule. The schedule maps
every policy vector that the government might
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choose (where policies are import and export taxes
and subsidies) into a campaign contribution level.
The government then sets a policy vector and collects
the contribution associated with its choice.
Let introduce some notations: p is the vector of
domestic prices; C/p) - the contribution schedule
tendered by lobby i; ~(P) - gross-of-contributions
joint welfare of the members oflobby group i; G(p) -
government's utility function; L - set of sectors which
are able to organize a lobby group.
The authors are interested in the political equili-
brium of a two-stage non-cooperative game in which
the lobbies simultaneously choose their political
contribution schedules in the first stage and the
government sets policy in the second. An equilibrium
is a set of contribution functions {CIO (P)}, one for
each organized lobby group, such that each one maxi-
mizes the joint welfare of the group's members given
the schedules set by the other groups and the anti-
cipated political optimization by the government; and
a domestic price vector pO that maximizes the govern-
ment's objective taking the contribution schedules as
given. The Nash-equilibrium contribution schedules
implement an equilibrium policy choice.
Grossman - Helpman's model has the structure
of a menu-auction problem. Bernheim and Whinston
(1986) have characterized the equilibrium for a class
of such problems. Grossman and He1pman applied
these results to the problem of protection trade policy.
The adaptation resulted in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. ({CiO}i/.I po}) is a subgame-perfect
Nash equilibrium of the trade policy game if and only if:
(i) CIO is feasible for all il.;
(ii) po maximizes G(p) on the set of domestic
price vector;
(iii)po maximizes ~(P) - C/(P) + G(p) on the set
of domestic price vector for every jL;
(iv) for every jL there exists ap that maximizes
G(p) on the set of domestic price vector such that
C/cP) =0.
Condition (i) states that lobby's contributions
must be nonnegative and no greater than the joint
income available to the sector. Condition (ii) states
that, given the political contributions offered by the
lobbies, the government sets trade policy to maximize
its own welfare. Condition (iii) stipulates that for every
lobby, the equilibrium price vector must maximize the
joint welfare of that lobby and the government, given
the contributions offered by other lobbies. Condition
(iv) requires that for every lobby j there must exist a
policy that elicits a contribution of zero from lobby j,
which the government finds equally attractive as the
equilibrium policy po. If there does not exist such a
policy, then lobby j can lower their political contri-
butions without changing the government's choice,
which necessarily leaves sector j strictly better off.
Condition (iii) characterizes the equilibrium
structure of protection. Condition (iv) characterizes
the equilibrium structure of political contributions.
Our problem and the one of Grossman-Help man
are very similar and we largely rely on the significant
results obtained by the authors, however there are
several differences. The differences come from three
issues. The first one is the fact that Russian regional
governments can not use export and import tariffs and
subsidies opposed to the case of Grossman - He1pman
consideration and are restricted to other tools of price
regulation: price ceiling, price mark-ups, input and
output subsidies, tax exemptions or credits. The se-
cond issue stems from the requirement of financial
acceptability of the regional protection policy, regi-
onal budget constraint needs explicit introduction
into the model. The third difference is explained by
the problem to distinguish between different tools of
the protection policy. These differences modify Gros-
sman - Helpman's model and obviously its analytical
inferences as well.
2.3. Formal framework
We consider a regional market with tradable
goods i=O,I, ... .n. The local demand curve for a
particular good is d/pJ. Assume that when there is no
price dispersion all consumers prefer domestic
goods. Suppose that in the absence of trade the
equilibrium price of goods i=I, ....n is higher than in
the situation of interregional and/or international
trade. Assume that there is no possibility for the
protection of good O. Let use good 0 as a numeraire,
and1etitspriceequalto 1,Po=1.
The supply curves ofloca1 producers depend on
input and output exogenous prices and/or
implemented local protection policy. Assume that the
regional government can use input, output subsidies
and tax exemptions. We assume that production in
each sector requires labor and a specific input,
subsidized and regulated are prices of the specific
inputs. Consequently the supply function of a locally
produced good i depends on price (which differs from
the exogenous market price if local government
imposes price limitations), input subsidy, output
subsidy, input price restrictions, and tax exemption
Y/Pi' Si';,l where Pi is exogenous price, SI is subsidy per
unit of good i, I is subsidy per unit of specific input in
sector i, and 1- tax exemptions granted to sector i. Let
denote by p, s, '. the vectors of output prices, output
and input subsidies, and tax exemptions respectively.
Let the regional economy is populated by in-
dividuals with identical preferences. Each individual
maximizes utility given by
n
U = Xo +LuJx;} (1)
;=1
where x, is consumption of good 0 and Xi is
consumption of good i, i=I, ....n. With these quasi-
linear preferences demand for good i is independent
of the prices of other goods, and possibilities for
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Where ose«:
We consider a two-stage non-cooperative game:
in the first stage sector's lobbies make decisions and
propose political contributions contingent on prote-
Where t is the tax rate, z[p; SjI I,) - demand for ction policy; in the second stage the regional govern-
specific input in sector i, and reflects the local ment determines the implemented policy. An equili-
government ability to 'soften' local budget, it can be brium is a set of contribution functions {CIOWI,Sjll')}'
done through transferring expenses oflocal policy to one for each sector, such that each one maximizes the
another budgets or by obtaining additional resources joint welfare of the sector's members given the
from higher level budgets. schedules proposed by the other sectors and the anti-
The producers are interested in protection of their cipated optimization by the regional government; and
sectors and enter the political activity. The lobby a regional protection policy vector WIO,SIO,/ I)that ma-
representing a sector i makes its political contribution ximizes the government's objective taking the contri-
contingent on the protection policy implemented by bution schedules as given. The Nash-equilibrium
the government. Denote by CIWjlSn) the contribution realizes an equilibrium policy.
tendered by lobby i. The lobby determines the contri- The proposed formal framework corresponds to
butions to maximize total welfare of the sector's mem- the structure of Grossman-Help man's problem. How-
bers: labor income plus profit of the sector plus consu- ever, the modification of the Grossman-Helpman's
mer surplus and benefits from the public expenditures model and more detailed consideration of some
less contributions. The scheme of the distribution of issues modify Proposition 1.The proposition relevant
the political donations among the sector's members is to our problem is as follows.
out of consideration here. We assume the existence of Proposition 2. ({CIOjiV (po,l, 0,OJ) is a subgame-
ways to allow all the members to share the gains from perfect Nash equilibrium of the regional protection
the political coordination. The joint gross-of-contri- policy game if and only if:
bution welfare of the members of sector i is: (a) (clOj is feasible for all iL;
WJ p,s, p.r ) =n/li + [Pi yJ Pi' Pi'Si''t )-(ni• - p;)zJ Pi' Pi'Si''t;) -nJiJ +
+Ui[ r( p,S, p,'t)+ CS( p)J - Ci(Pi,Si' Pi''t i) = Pi Yi( Pi' Pi,Si''t .l :
-(n; - p;)zJ Pi' Pi'Si,'t)+uJr( p,S, p,'t)+ CS( p)J -cJ Pi,Si' Pi''t) =
= VJp,s, p.r )-cJ Pi,Si' Pi''ti)
substitutions of complementarities among the goods
are absent. An individual spending an amount E
consumes xi=diW) of good i, i=I, ... .n, where the




The consumer surplus derived from the goods is
equal to
n n
CS(p) = LuJdJpi ))- LPidJPi)
i=1 i=1
Where p is the vector of the exogenous prices.
The protection must be financially acceptable.
The fmancial acceptability means satisfying the bud-
get constraint, local government expenditures should
be less than receipts. The receipts are in the form of
taxation of the domestic aggregate income, the ex-
penditure items are input and output subsidies to local
producers. The excess of receipt over protection
expenditures, here regarded as a source of public
expenditures fmancing, is:
r(p,s,p;t)={~(1- 't; )Y/Pi,Si,Pi,'t)+E- ~PA(Pi )]-
-[tSIY/PI ,Si'PI''t)+ tPiZ/Pi 'Si'Pi''tI)]~ ~o (3)
j:z} 1=1
(2)
Where 1- the wage rate; I- - exogenous price of the
specific input in sector i; I - share of the voting
population related to sector i.
The government's utility function depends on
attitudes towards government. There are two extreme
types of government presented in the literature as
stark alternatives: benevolent and Leviathan. When
the government is a benevolent, it is a maximizer of
their citizens' welfare. A Leviathan-government ma-
ximizing items of expenditures benefits only the
policy-makers. Amore general assumption is that po-
licy-makers are neither wholly benevolent nor whol-
ly self-serving, an obvious conclusion is that the
policy-makers maximize a weighted sum of citizens'
welfare and their own wellbeing. The latter assum-
ption is accepted for our problem.
The incumbent government maximizes a
weighted sum of political contributions and aggre-
gate welfare ofthe population. The political contribu-
tions provide direct benefits to the government. How-
ever the social welfare can result in indirect benefits if
voters are more likely to reelect a government that




Gtp.s.o,x )» LCJPi,Si,Pi,'t)+8L"V;(p,s,p,'t) (5)
iEL i=1
(4)
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VW/ pO,SO,pO,TO )+VG( pO,So,pO,TO )-AVr( pO,SO,pO,TO )=0
VG( ° ° ° 0) 1'V ( ° ° ° 0)p ,S ,p ,1' -/l, r p ,S ,p ,1' =0
(b) (pO,/, 0, oJ maximizes G(p,s,,) subject to
budget constraint r(s,) 0 for all iL;
(c) (po,/, %Jmaximizes ~(P,s,,) + G(p,s,,)
subjectto budget constraint r(s,) 0 for every jL;
(d) for every jL there exists a bundle Vi,i/,~that
maximizes G(p,s,,) subject to budget constraint such
that c/Vi,i//) =0.
Condition (a) implies that lobby's proposals are
positive and less than welfare of members of the
represented sector. Condition (b) states that given the
political proposals of the interest groups the govern-
ment determines input and output subsidies, tax
exemptions maximizing its utility function and sati-
sfying the budget constraint taking into account exo-
genous price of output. Condition (c) stipulates that
for every sector the equilibrium bundle of input and
output subsidies and tax exemptions maximizes sum
of welfare ofthe sector and the government, given the
budget constraint and the proposals of other lobbies.
Condition (d) means that for every sector j partici-
pating in the political lobbing exists a combination of
subsidies and tax exemptions, which requires contri-
bution of zero from sectorj, and which is equivalent
for the government to equilibrium protection policy.
2.4. The equilibrium structure of protection
policy
Grossman and Helpman have proved that if the
contribution schedules are differentiable around the
equilibrium, the shape of the political contributions
reveal the lobbies' true preferences in the neigh-
borhood of the equilibrium. They have also demon-
strated an interesting characteristic of Nash equili-
bria, in equilibrium government behaves as if it attri-
buted to lobbies higher weight than other population.
Below we show that these results hold to our model as
well.
Let assume that the political contribution fun-
ctions and welfare functions are differentiable. To
characterize the structure of the equilibrium protec-
tion policy let consider conditions (b) and (c) Propo-
sition 2, they imply that the first order condition is
isfied fOOOO,}satis ie at IP .s " :
(6)
(7)
Where A. is a Lagrange multiplier. Inserting (7) into (6) gives VW/ »".SO.p", T° ) = 0 .
By definition
(4) VW/ pO,So,po,To )=VV/ pO,So,po,To )-Vc/ p~,S~,p~,T~).
Taken together the equations imply
VV ( ° 0 0 0) V ( ° ° ° 0)j p ,s ,p ,1' = cj Pj,Sj'Pj,Tj (8)
Equation (8) establishes that around the equilibrium change in the political contributions reflects
the effect of change of the government protection policy on the joint welfare of members of the
lobby's group.
By the definition
( ° ° ° o)-V( ° ° ° 0) W( ° ° ° °Ci Pi .s, ,Pi .t; - i P ,S ,p ,1' - i P ,S ,p ,1' ), (4)
where W;(po,l,/, I) is net-of-contribution welfare of group i members. If the political contributions
correspond to true preferences of the group. then W;(po,l,/, 1)~((p,s,p, 1') and
cd s? ,pJ ) ~ Vd sO ,po )- Wd s,p) (9)
Condition (b) of Proposition 2 states that if (po,l,po, I) and (p.s.p-t} are feasible then
G( pO,So,po,To )~G( p.s.p.t ),
or
n n
2:cJ p~,S~,p~,T~ )+82:VJ pO,So,po,To )~2:cJ Pi,Si,Pi,Ti )+82:V;( p.s.p.r ),
ieL i=1 ieL i=1
From expression (9)
n n2:V; ( pO,So,po,To )+82:VJ pO,So,po,To )~2:VJ p.s.p.r )+82:V;( p.s.p.t ),
ieL i=1 ieL i=1
Consequently the government in the equilibrium maximizes weighted sum of welfare of different
groups of population. Welfare of groups of population presented by lobbies in the political process
receives weight (1+e), welfare of other ones receives weight e. where O~eS1.
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Let us present in a more detailed record expression (7), it takes form
n
IVcJ p7,s7,p7,T7 )+oIvvJ pO,SO,pO,TO)-AVr( pO,SO,pO,TO)=0. Inserting (8)
~L ~1
into the expression gives
" n ° ° ° ° ~n ° ° ° ° 1n ° ° ° °L. vVdp .s ,p ,T )+0L.VVdp .s ,p ,T )-/Lvr(p .s ,p ,T )=0 (10)
iEL i=l
The equation shows how marginal change of protection policy influences the welfare of the
groups of populations distinguishing between participating and not participating in lobbing.
So the features of the equilibrium structure of the regional protection policy are as follows.
Firstly, around equilibrium the political contributions reveal preferences of the interest groups
regarding protection policy. Secondly, equilibrium protection policy results in distribution of welfare in
favor of the sectors, participating into political lobbing. Thirdly, in equilibrium marginal change of
welfare of different groups influenced by the protection policy depends on the participation in political
lobbing.
We consider further features of the different protection tools: output subsidies, input subsidies, or tax
exemptions. Let us first consider output subsidies
a) Output subsidies
We analyze a solution of equation (10).
VW/ pO.s" .p", TO)+ VG( pO.s" .p", TO)-AVr( pO.s" .p", TO) = 0 (6)
VG( pO,so .p",TO)_ AVr( pO.s" .p",TO) = 0 (7)
Where A is a Lagrange multiplier. Inserting (7) into (6) gives VWj ( p", SO.p", TO) = 0 .
By definition
(4) vw ( ° ° ° 0) vv ( ° ° ° 0) n ( ° ° ° 0)v j p ,s ,p ,T = v j p .s ,p ,T - vCj Pj,Sj'Pj,Tj .
Taken together the equations imply
vv ( ° 0 0 0) n ( ° ° ° 0) (8)v j P .s ,p ,T = vCj Pj,Sj'Pj,Tj
Equation (8) establishes that around the equilibrium change in the political contributions reflects
the effect of change of the government protection policy on the joint welfare of members of the
lobby's group.
By the definition
( ° ° ° 0) V( ° ° ° 0) W( ° ° ° 0) (4)Ci Pi ,Si .p; ,Ti = i P ,S ,p ,T - i P ,S ,p ,T ,
where Wlpo,l,/, f) is net-of-contribution welfare of group i members. If the political contributions
correspond to true preferences of the group, then ~(po,l,/, f ):?Wl(p,s,p, -r) and
cdsf,pJ )?VdsO,pO )-Wds,p) (9)
Condition (b) of Proposition 2 states that if (po,l,po, f) and (p,s,p, -r) are feasible then
G( pO.s" .p", TO)? G( p,s,p, T), or
n n
IcJ p7 ,s7 ,p7 ,T7 )+OIVJ pO,SO.p" ,To) ?IcJ PpSi,PpTi )+OIVJ p.s.p.t ).
ieL i=l ieL i=l
From expression (9)
n n
IVJ pO,so,po,~ )+OIVJ pO,so,po,~ )?IVJ p.s.o.t: )+OIV;( p.s.p.t ).
ieL i=l ieL i=l
Consequently the government in the equilibrium maximizes weighted sum of welfare of different
groups of population. Welfare of groups of population presented by lobbies in the political process
receives weight (1+e),welfare of other ones receives weight e,where o~es:J.
Let us present in a more detailed record expression (7), it takes form
n
IVcJ p7 ,s7 .p", T7 )+ 0IVVJ pO.s" .p", TO)- AVr( pO.s" .p", TO) =o. Inserting (8)
~L ~1
,,
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into the expression gives
" 0 0 0 0 ~V 0 0 0 0 ~'V 0 0 0 0L... vVd P .s ,P ,T )+B L... vd P .s ,P ,T )-/1.. r( P ,S ,p ,T )=0 (10)
iEL i=l
The equation shows how marginal change of protection policy influences the welfare of the
groups of populations distinguishing between participating and not participating in lobbing.
So the features of the equilibrium structure of the regional protection policy are as follows.
Firstly, around equilibrium the political contributions reveal preferences of the interest groups
regarding protection policy. Secondly, equilibrium protection policy results in distribution of welfare in
favor of the sectors, participating into political lobbing. Thirdly, in equilibrium marginal change of
welfare of different groups influenced by the protection policy depends on the participation in political
lobbing.
We consider further features of the different protection tools: output subsidies, input subsidies, or tax
exemptions. Let us first consider output subsidies
a) Output subsidies
We analyze a solution of equation (10).
av:o * dy' * az· arFrom (4) we find __ l =aij( Pi _l -(7Ci _pi)_l )+ai-- ,as . as . as . as .] ] ] ]
where Oij - Kronecker's symbol. Substitution of the terms in expressions (10) allows to derive
~ .dy. • ~. ~ ~ .dy. • ~. ~
~(aij(pi _, -(7Ci -Pi)_' )+ai-)+B ~(aij(pi _, -(7Ci _p)_' )+ai-)-
ieL asj asj asj i=1 asj asj asj
-1 ar =0
aSj
Let us introduce an indicator variable 'Pithat equals 1 if the sector uses lobby pressure and 0 - otherwise.
Denote Lai by L*. The equation takes the form
ieL
• ayj • az j ar
(p. -- (7C.- p. )-)(1J+ qJ.)= -(1- L*-B)., as. ' 'as. 'as., , ,
ar ay . dy . az .
From (3) we find - = (t-T)-' - P(Yj +Sj -' +Pj -').as j asj as j as j
Inserting let to derive
1 aZj B+qJj 1/ • B+qJj 1/ B+qJj 1/
Sj = l+e~ «-«, - Pj ~'. (1+ 1-L-B / p) +7Cj1-L-B / P- r, 1-L-B / p),, vY,
where e/ - subsidy elasticity of production goodj. Let B+ qJj = k , then
1-L-B
1 aZj k • k k
s· =--(t-T. -p.-(1+-)+7C.-- p.-)
, 1+e; , , dyj P 'P 'P
Proposition 3. The government in the equilibrium chooses output subsidies that satisfy
1 aZj k • k k .Sj =--s (t-Tj-Pj-(1+-)+7Cj--Pj-) for all je Z,... .n
l+ej dyj P P P
So output subsidies for a good positively correlated with tax rate, ability of the regional
administration to soften regional budget constraint, with weight attributed to population's welfare,
exogenous input price, with lobbing activity of the sector and overall lobbing pressure of the regional
producers. Output subsidy for a particular good negatively correlated with level of exogenous output
price, subsidy elasticity of production, granted tax exemptions and input subsidies.
In contrast with Grossman-Helpman's economy, where export and import tariffs are considered, our
case is restricted to positive subsidies. International trade policy belongs to federal level jurisdiction and
regional authorities do not have to interfere with this sphere.
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az. k k • az.
OUtput subsidies are positive if (t - '(j) - P j _1 (1+- )+- (trj - P j ) > o. Assume _1 > 0 and
(]yj f3 f3 (]yj
kst), the latter requires A-L-B>O, which means that the regional authority has tight budget, at least enough
tight to take the budget into consideration when the government faces pressure from population and
lobbing groups. When the budget is not binding restriction of the policy-making, the government may
grant any subsidies and any tax exemptions, it is not the case of our analysis.
The first term in the above expression is always positive, the second one is always negative, and sign
of the third one depends on technology and input and output prices. So granting output subsidies to a
producer depends on input subsidies, tax exemptions to the producer, on ration of input and output
exogenous prices and technology of the production.
The range of output subsidies values is presented in Diagram 1
Diagram 1
S I S', TC~
j!a :,.;~ J ~ ~~
a 1....••...•. j' . . . . • . . . . . • • . • . • . . . . . • . . • . • . ~ oj •••••••••
, ~:
1 ~ 1








k 1 1 f3








1 k °a= --(t--(p. -tr.),
1+e; f3 1 1
b) Input subsidies
We continue analysis of the equation (10).
avo (]y... az. ar
From equation (4) _-, = O"ij[Pi --, - (tri - Pi )--' + e.l +ai --, equation (10) takes form:
apj aPj apj aPj
----_. --.-------------------------------------------------------~-
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1 ( cry. cry. cry. * Jp. = (t-1".)-' -So -' fJ- p. -' k+1!.k ,
, (1+ ej)(k + fJ) , dZ j , dZ j , dZ j ,
where ef - input price subsidy elasticity of demand for input of production good j.
Proposition 4. The government in the equilibrium chooses input subsidies that satisfy
1 ( cryj cryj cryj * J- t-1" --s - - -k+1! kP j - (1+ ej)(k + fJ) ( j) dZ j j dZ j fJ P j dz j j
for allj=l, ...,n
So input subsidies for a good positively correlate with level of the exogenous input price, with tax
rate, weight attributed to population's welfare, ability of the regional administration to soften regional
budget constraints and lobbing activity. However the level of input subsidy for a particular good
negatively correlates with output exogenous price, with input price subsidy elasticity of demand for input,
with tax exemptions and output subsidies to the sector.
If we assume that kz-I), then input subsidies are positive if
cry. * dy.
(t-1"j)-' +1!jk--' (sjfJ+Pjk) >0. The first and the second terms in the expression aredz j dZj
positive, the third term is negative.
So probability of input subsidy granting depends on ratio of tax exemption to tax level in the region,
on level of exogenous input price and output price, on granted output subsidies, on technology and
tightness of the regional budget constraint.



















Here '1/= fJ *cryj
(1+ ej)(k+ fJ) dZj'
1 ( cry. cry. • Jd = t-' -kp. -' k+1!.k (d
(1+ ej)(k + fJ) dz j J dz j J
1( 1!~k J 1!~k
f = fJ (t - p jk + cryj jdZ j .' g = t - P jk + cryj jdZ j
c) Tax exemptions
This case concludes the analysis of equation (10).
slope slope Jl=- 1 *cryj,
(1+ ej)(k + fJ) dz j
may be less or more than 1C*j),
(g may be less or more than t).
From (4) we find Substitution of the terms in
expressions to derive
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~ .~. .~. ~
-A- =0. The equation takes thefonn (Pj-' -(7rj - p)-' )(O+rp)=-(A-L-O).aTj aTj aTj aTj
aT ~ . iJy . az .
From (3) we find - = (t - T.) -' - Y.- P(s.-' +p. -' ). Inserting lets to deriveaT. ' aT. ' , aT. ' aT., , "
1 • az. az.
T· =--(t+7r.-' k-p.k-p.-' (k+P)-s·P) where Ej~ - tax exemption elasticity of'l+e: ':l... ":l... ",uY, uY, J
production good j.
Proposition 5. The government in the equilibrium chooses tax exemptions that satisfy
So tax exemptions for a sector positively correlate with tax rate, with weight attributed to
population's welfare, with lobbing activity of the sector and with input exogenous price. Tax exemptions
for a sector negatively correlate with level of exogenous output price, tax exemption elasticity of the
production, input and output subsidies granted to the sector.












1 k+ P * aZj
Here slope u = - --~ ' slope w = ---~ :l.. '
l+ej l+ej UYj
1 • az j
less or more than t), n = -(t +s , -k - p .k),P 'iJyj ,
1 • az·
m = -- (t +7r.-' k - p .k) (m may be
l+e: ':l... ', uY,
k. t+kpj
Z = --7r. + (z may be less or
k +P , az j liJy /k +P)
more than n).
The table below summarizes the characteristics of the equilibrium protection policy.
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Weight attributed to population's welfare
Overall lobbing pressure on a regional
government
Political activity of the sector's lobby
Output subsidy elasticity of production
Input price subsidy elasticity of demand for
input
Tax exemption elasticity of production
Ability of the regional administration to
soften regional budget constraint
3. Empirical Estimations
3.1. Hypotheses
Assuming the model is correct the empirical
estimations will support the hypotheses as follows.
Hypothesis 1. Output subsidies, input subsidies
and tax exemptions are substituting tools of the
regional protection. Each of the measures negatively
correlates with others.
To test this hypothesis correlation of subsidies
and tax exemptions will be estimated.
Hypothesis 2. Regional subsidizing and gran-
ting tax exemptions is a feature of the regions having
higher tax burden in the regions.
For testing these hypotheses connection
between subsidies, tax exemptions and level of the
regional tax collection must be estimated.
Hypothesis 3. Regions demonstrating active
subsidizing and granting tax exemptions have larger
share of transfers from the federal center which is one
ofthe ways to soften regional budget constraint.
To test the hypothesis the dependence of
subsidies and tax exemptions on level of federal
transfers received by region has to be estimated.
Hypothesis 4. Subsidizing and granting tax
exemptions positively correlated with political lob-
bing of the interest groups.
Lobbying power depends on the concentration
of the producer's interests; the higher is the
concentration the higher is the ability to influence the
government and to persuade it of the protection. To
test the hypothesis the correlation of the regional
subsidizing and tax exemptions with level of the
regional specialization should be estimated. Usually
the agreements between policy-makers and business
have a long-term character, so an autoregressive

















Hypothesis 5. Activity of the regional protection
depends on needs of the population, in the model the
corresponding indicator is weight attributed to the
population's welfare. Some literature considers indu-
stry protection as result of social policy, the protec-
tion is granted to industries that would, otherwise, be
declining. One of the possible consequences of decli-
ne is unemployment; correlations of the protection
activity with level of unemployment will be esti-
mated.
Hypothesis 6. Subsidies and tax exemptions
depend on exogenous prices, so macroeconomic
demand and supply shocks resulting in sharp change
of the prices may also result in change of protection
activity. Two years in the recent period (1995 and
1998) in Russia were famous for sharp devaluation of
ruble, growth of consumer demand and prices of
goods of both import and domestic production.
Correlations of the protection activity with macro-
economic price indexes and two macro-shock dum-
my variables for 1995 and 1998 will be estimated.
Hypothesis 7. Statistical data on subsidies and
tax exemptions allow assuming extension of the
regional protection practice in the considered years.
So time trend needs to be included.
3.2. Information
Testing of the formulated hypotheses assumes
data for a period of time on subsidies, tax exemptions,
and import by regions and by sectors, and informa-
tion on structure of economies, on budgets, and taxes
by regions.
Reports on the executed regional budgets for
1996 - 2000 are taken from Ministry of Finance of the
Russian Federation. The reports contain information
on total subsidies provided by the regional authorities
to local producers. The characteristics of regional
economic development, including dynamics, price
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3.3. Methods of estimation
Initial system
The theoretical model structure implies doing
an empirical analysis by sectors and by regions.
Because of radical changes during transition period
in Russia time effect must be taken into consideration
as well. Let i=1, ... ,N is index for sector, r =1, ...,R is
index for region, and t=1, ... ,T is index for time. The
system of the hypotheses shapes the system of
regression equations as follows.
Subsidies.; = f(Dummies _ for _ macro - shocks., Level_ of _ taxationi
Transfers n » Share _ in _ regional_ production.i, Exogenous _ price., (A)
Tax exemptton.; ,Unemployment rt ,Time _ trend, ,Subsidiesir(t-l») + J..lr +v rt + S irt
Tax _ exemptions.; = f(Dummies _ for _ macro - shocks., Level_ of
taxation Share in regional_ productions; ,Exogenous _ price; ,
n » - - (B)
Subsidies.i, Unemployment.i, Transfers.i, Time _ trend"
Tax _ exemptionsir(t_l») +D r + ~rl +E irt
level, and structures of the production are presented
in statistical yearbook "Regions of Russia ".
However the disaggregated information on sub-
sidies by 10 sectors was obtained only for Novo-
sibirsk region, but for longer period 1995 - 2002. The
aggregated data on subsidies for all Russian regions
in 1996 - 2000 are presented in the regional budgets.
Information on the regional tax exemptions is reflec-
ted in database "Consultant Plus. Regional legisla-
tion", these data reflect the fact of tax exemptions
granted without estimations of sum of the tax relief.
The qualitative data on the value of the tax exemp-
tions was available also for Novosibirsk region only
(for 1995 - 2002). Tax exemptions variable for Rus-
sian regions is constructed assuming that three types
of tax relief might be a result of lobbing activity: tax
relief for particular enterprises, tax relief for
industries and setting up free economic zones. Any of
these tax reliefs contributes 1 to the tax exemptions
variable, so the variable takes values from 0 to 3, the
former corresponds to case of no tax relief, the latter
means granting three types of the mentioned ones.
In order to test the formulated hypotheses under
the conditions of the restricted information we esti-
mated two systems. Each of the systems is a modifi-
cation of one corresponding to the system of the
advanced hypotheses above.
Where:
,. ,. - fixed regional effect;
rP rP - random regional error;
I" - random sector's error; .
Subsidies.; - subsidies for sector i from regional
budget in region r in year t; .
Dummies for years, - dummy year vanables;
Level of taxation" - tax income per capita in total
regional budget income in region r in year t;
Transfers" - share of transfers from federal
budget in the regional budget income in region r in
yeart;
Share in regional production.; - share of sector i
in production of region r in year t;
Exogenous price, - average price level for
sector's iproduction in year t;
Tax exemptions ; - tax exemptions for sectors i
provided by regional government in region r in year t;
Unemployment" - share of unemployed active
population in region r in year t;
lime trend, - number of year t.
As it is mentioned above quantitative data for
subsidies and tax exemptions by sectors were
obtained for one region - Novosibirsk region, hence
the regional variables and the regional effects cannot
be estimated on the basis of the data available by
sectors. Unemployment rate, budgetary transfers
from the federal level, and level of taxation in a region
are among these regional variables. These regional
characteristics are constant for different sectors in a
region for every year and become a part of time effect
for the panel estimations.
The modified system adapted for one region is
as follows:
Modification 1
Subsidiesb = f(Shore _in_regional_production.,Exogenous _priceb,
Tax _ exemption., Dummies _for _ macro - shocks" Time _ trend,
Subsidiesl(t-l»)+t.,+u. (A")
Tax_ exen¢ons. =f(Share _ in _ regional_production. ,IMnmies _for
macro =shocks, Exogenous _price. ,Subsidies. ,Tune _ trend"
Tax_~('-l»)+CPi +u. (B")
Subscript i identifies sector, t - year; A I and cP I
are sector's effects.
However effect of the omitted regional variab-
les (unemployment, federal transfers, and regional
level of taxation) is of interest as well, in order to
estimate their contribution the estimations were done
on the basis of data aggregated by sector. The infor-
mation on tax exemption is another as well; it is fact
of tax granting. Variable of tax exemptions is equal to
the number of decisions on tax exemptions adopted in
the region. Variable of share of industry in regional
production have to be omitted, since sum of the
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shares for a region equals one. However as a proxy for
lobbing pressure in a region dummy variable of
specialization level is introduced, which takes value
"1" when there is an industry producing more than
113 of total regional industrial product and value "0"
otherwise. Variable of exogenous price in the aggre-
gated by sectors case coincides with time effect. The
observations have the panel structure and include
characteristics of 88 regions over time period 1996 -
2000. Since 1995 is not in the covered period, one
dummy variable for macro-shock in 1998 is used in
the estimations.
Modification 2
Subsidies rt = f (Dummy _ for _ macro - shock., Level _ of _ taxationrt,
Transfers n s Tax _ exemptions Unemployments, Specialization _levelrt,
Time _ trend I' Subsidies r(I-I») + Ar +Srt
Tax _ exemptions.; = f(Dummy _ for _ macro - shock., Level_ of
taxation i,Subsidies rt s Specialization _levelil, Unemployment.i, Transfers rt s
Time _ trend I' Tax _ exemptions r(I-I») + Ilr +Sri
2 -1 0 0 0 0
-1 2 -1 0 ... 0 0 0
G=




I 0 0 0Yil






0 0 0 0 Yil "'Yi6 Xii
I
Xi7
YI,2 -YI,I XI 3 I_XI 2
I
YI,3 - YI,2 , ,
I I
YI,4 - YI,3 YI,3 - YI,2 XI,4 -XI,3
I I
YI,8 - YI,7 YI,7 - YI,6 XI,8 -XI,7
~y= '~Y-I = /),){=,
I I
YIO,3 - YIO,2 YIO,2 - YIO,I XIO,3 - XIO,2
I I
YIO,4 - YIO,3 YIO,3 - YIO,2 XIO,4 - XIO,3
...
I I
YIO,8 - YIO,7 YIO,7 - YIO,6 XIO,8 -XIO,7
Comments on the new notations are below.
Subsidies" - share of subsidies for the local
producers in regional budget expenditures in region r
inyeart;
Specialization level" - dummy variable for the
specialization level, which takes value "1" when
there is an industry producing more than 113 oftotal
regional industrial product in region r in year t and
value "0" otherwise;
Tax exemptions" - number of decisions granted
different tax exemptions in region r in year t;
A rand Jl r - regional effects.
The equations (A'), (B'), (A") and (B") are dyn-
amic panel regressions with endogenous variables.
One of the proposed methods for such models is the
two-step Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimator,
where past variables are used as instruments.
For instance consider equation (A'), where
i=I, ...,10, t=I, ... ,8. For convenience, we introduce
the following notations: YII - subsidies.; vector x; -
vector of independent variables in it equation (A'). So
we have y.: 0 Y.t.J+ Xii' {3+ A i+ V it' Instruments for Yit
are Yu' where s<t, instruments for Xit are Xu, where s<t.
Define
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The matrix of instruments is W=[W1 ', ••• , WlO'I. The preliminary first-step consistent estimator:
[ ]-I[ ]
8. ,10 -I ,10-1(p:)= (6.y_i-8.X) W( ~W,Gw.) W'(,iy _1M) (,iy _1M) W( ~w.GW;) W\1y
,
Differenced residuals obtained from the preliminary estimator: ,1,:Di = AYi - 80AYi._1 - Axi Po.
10, ,
Define ~ =I W; A viA Vi W;
i~1
The resulting estimator is:
(~::: ) = [(,iy _1M )' W17-lw'(6.y _1M )n(6.y_1M )' W17 -IW\1yJ
A consistent estimate of the asymptotic variance of the coefficients is given byva{~::)= [(ay _1M)W17-IW'(ay _1M)r
The same way of estimation is used for equations (B') and (A") - (B").
4.3. Results of the estimations
The results of the empirical estimations are presented in the tables below.
Variables








Share in regional production
Exogenous price
Tax exemptions












So the correlation ofthe subsidies provided for
the sectors with subsidies of the previous year and
macroeconomic price shocks is significant and po-
sitive. There was increasing tendency in subsidizing
local producers, time variable is positive and signi-
ficant. Other variables were insignificant for Novo-
sibirsk region. However, they have predicted sign.
Variables
Table 3. The results of regression (B') estimation
Coefficient P-value
Constant
Dummy for macroeconomic shock
1995
Dummy for macroeconomic shock
1998
Time linear trend
Share in regional production
Exogenous price
Subsidies
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Variables
Table 4. The results of regression (A") estimation
P-value
Constant






























Table s. The results of regression (B") estimation
Coefficient P-value
Constant




























The results confirm negative correlation of tax
exemptions with exogenous output price level for the
sectors and positive correlation with macroeconomic
instability. There is practice of long-term supporting
of the producers in the region, tax exemptions in the
previous year is significant and positive variable.
Weight of the sectors in regional production and
provided subsidies are insignificant.
In both regressions the share of the sectors in the
regional production is insignificant variable so the
weight is not important, the lobbing activity itself is
more important. Subsidies and tax exemptions are
granted to the sectors, which had obtained them in the
past and continue to keep their positions. One of the
factors of value for subsidies and of tax exemptions is
the macroeconomic situation. Size of subsidies and
tax exemptions does not depend on each other.
The estimations on the sample of the aggregated
data for Russia, have confirmed dependence of sub-
sidies and tax exemptions on tax burden in the region
and on transfers obtained from the higher-level
budget. Higher level of taxation and transfers from
federal level budget are the factors allowing the regi-
onal governments to increase the subsidizing of the
local firms and granting them tax exemptions.
Unemployment is not significant factor of the
regional protection, so the social factordoes not in-
fluence the regional governments' decisions on the
protection of local producers very much. The
estimations on the country level sample have confir-
med the results received for one region that the regi-
onal authorities prefer to support the same sectors,
significant are correlations with previous year level
of the support. Another common feature is tendency
to increase the protection for local producers through
subsidizing and tax relief; both ofthe activities have a
significant growing trend.
4. Conclusions
Regional authorities in Russia acting on the re-
quest of the local business groups interfere with local
market price mechanism. Direction of the influence
provides more favorable conditions to the local pro-
ducers. Regional authorities use a wide range oflegal
protection instruments: from direct (price ceiling,
making-up price, limitations on profitability, limita-
tions on trade extra charge, declaration about change
in price) to indirect methods (tax exemptions, credits,
subsidies, budget compensations, tax payments over-
due).
Protection of local producers becomes one of
the typical features of the sub-federal policy in Rus-
sia. The protection is provided because of political
pressure of local lobbing groups. The social factors
are not in the focus ofthe policy-maker's regards.
When regional authorities have got real power
they become an aim of activity of industrial interests
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groups. This process results in integration of interests
of regional policy-makers and local business. One of
the economic political consequences of the
interactions is the appearance of political collusions
between industrial groups and regional decision-
makers; one of the economic is disintegration of the
internal market in Russia. Under the conditions of
economic growth, which Russia is experiencing now,
a policy of competition suppressing through the
protection barriers is especially inefficient for a
region and for country as a whole.
The political options that could improve the
balance of the macroeconomic and regional interests
in the field of the local producers protection could be
adoption a legal document prohibiting discrimination
between local and external producers, restricting
level of subsidies, tax exemptions and guarantee
provided from the regional budget resources, and
obligatory competitive elements in the distribution of
subsidies and tax exemptions at the expenses of
regional budgets.
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